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Abstract 		Existing compliance research has focused on states’ adherence to international rules. We study state and also non-state actors’ adherence to international norms. By analyzing warring parties’ behaviour in granting access to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to detention centres between 1991 and 2006, we find that both governments and rebel groups adhere to the norm of accepting the ICRC to advance their pursuit of legitimacy. National governments are more likely to grant access when they are democracies and rely on foreign aid. Insurgent groups are more likely to grant access when they exhibit legitimacy-seeking characteristics such as having a legal political wing, relying on domestic support, controlling territory, and receiving transnational support. (Word count: 115)
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In the case of armed conflict not of an international character …
an impartial humanitarian body,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 1949


The special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross …
shall be recognized and respected at all times.

Art 125. Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949

The Puzzle of Compliance

In responding to the thirty-year-long civil war in Sudan, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has experienced a mixed reception by the warring parties. The resistance group in the South, the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), allowed ICRC delegates access to their detention centres for all but one year between 1991 and 2006. The Sudanese government, on the other hand, denied the ICRC full inspection of their detention centres for twelve out of the sixteen years in this period. 
The matter of ICRC access in Sudan raises several interesting questions for the study of international relations, in particular regarding why state and non-state actors adhere to international norms. The Sudanese case belies conventional wisdom regarding the regular behaviour of national governments and rebel groups.​[2]​ We generally expect governments to be more responsive than rebel groups to international norms. Yet this was not the case in Sudan. This apparent anomaly causes us to ask: Why would a national government deny visitation by the ICRC? Why would an insurgent group allow an international organization into its controlled zone? 
The record shows that some warring parties choose to allow international organizations such as the ICRC access to their facilities at the height of a civil war while others do not. On its face, this general pattern of compliance with international law is puzzling. On the government side, the decision to grant access to the ICRC is puzzling because the reach of international law is limited and because compliance means taking the risk of compromising one’s autonomy in heightened security situations. The Geneva Convention quoted at the beginning of this article recommends and encourages warring parties to accept the ICRC in their conflict zones for humanitarian assistance. However, like many other international rules and norms, this clause does not have direct binding power​[3]​ nor is it backed by any enforcement mechanisms. Nonetheless, accepting the ICRC has become a norm and common practice for many governments for over a hundred years.​[4]​ 
With regard to rebel groups, the phenomenon of granting access is puzzling partially because rebel groups rarely agree to the rule of letting the ICRC in.​[5]​ Without written agreements or explicit consent, how does compliance with international norms emerge for rebel groups? ​[6]​  Rebels did not have a seat at the negotiating table of the Geneva Convention​[7]​ and they generally do not participate, as states do, in formal legal processes—such as signing or ratifying international declarations—to signal their intentions and commitments. Nevertheless, some insurgent groups do accept the ICRC in their controlled zones, adhere to the norm of accepting ICRC visits, and comply with the recommendation set forth in the Geneva Convention. 
The act of granting access to detention centres is an important phenomenon to study for both practical and theoretical reasons. On a practical level, access to detention centres has important humanitarian consequences in internal conflicts. ICRC visits to detention centres are associated with improved access for victims of conflicts to basic needs such as water and sanitation; ICRC visits also increase the probability that judicial rights will be respected and that fair trials will occur. Visits by the ICRC to security and civilian detainees in times of conflict can help identify instances of ill-treatment and open up opportunities for the ICRC to take preventive measures and assist victims—opportunities that would otherwise not exist.​[8]​ 
After decades of research, we now better understand the compliance behaviour of states. We know less, however, about the compliance behaviour of non-state actors. Scholars of compliance with international institutions understandably tend to focus on the behaviour of states. States are the key negotiators and drafters of public international law and are themselves the signatories and enforcers of the international legal order. However, non-state actors are becoming increasingly important in world politics, and it is imperative to bring these actors into the domain of international institutions. In choosing to study non-state actors, we depart from previous work on compliance with international agreements by juxtaposing the political motivations of national governments and non-state actors and by exploring their similarities and differences in terms of their compliance behaviour with international rules.  
In addition to making contributions to the literature on compliance and international institutions, our study also connects the literature on international institutions with scholarship on civil war. The theoretical connections between these topics yield insights into the roles of non-state actors in zones of civil conflict, such as rebel groups and international organizations. Understanding the motivations of these actors in turn helps us understand under what circumstances some aspects of international law can still prevail, even in the largely anarchical context of civil conflict. 
By analyzing the behaviour of both national governments and rebel groups, we find that warring parties adhere to the international standard of accepting the ICRC in their detention centres when the decision is incentive-compatible with their political motivation to gain or maintain legitimacy. In particular, we find that democratic governments as well as governments that rely heavily on foreign aid are more likely to grant access to the ICRC due to their concern for regaining political legitimacy. For their part, insurgent groups that strive to appear as legitimate political entities in the eyes of domestic and international supporters are more likely to grant access to the ICRC in their search for eventual political recognition. These legitimacy-seeking incentives are consistent with the military and strategic goals of warring parties in civil conflicts.  
This article proceeds as follows. We first develop our argument that the pursuit of political legitimacy is a key motivator behind compliance decisions and introduce empirically testable hypotheses based on the decision calculus of national governments and insurgent groups. We then present our statistical analyses of ICRC visitation records from 1991 to 2006 and discuss the implications of these findings in the context of compliance research. 

Legitimacy-Based Theory of Compliance 

We argue that the pursuit of political legitimacy explains compliance behaviour for both governments and armed opposition groups. ​[9]​ Political concern for legitimacy can be important for warring parties in their quest to achieve a ‘right to rule.’ We define legitimacy as a political attribute of a ruler whose political authority and right to rule are accepted by those under his or her rule.​[10]​ The concern of states for legitimacy is well documented in the literature​[11]​; the parallel concern of non-state actors is less well documented. Armed opposition groups may want to achieve recognition as a viable political entity,​[12]​ which is a necessary step toward achieving legitimacy. For rebel groups in civil conflicts, legitimacy is something that must be actively earned, whereas for governments, legitimacy is seen as something that must be regained. The achievement of legitimacy requires political constituencies or audiences, as the concept deals with the relationship between rulers and the ruled. Two sources of legitimacy are important for warring parties in civil conflicts: domestic audiences and international audiences. Warring parties typically strive to be regarded as viable actors both by domestic society and by the international community. 
Granting access for detainee visits is part of a legitimization strategy that brings material and non-material benefits that enhance a warring party’s chances of surviving militarily and politically. Granting access to the ICRC, a prominent international organization, opens the door for other types of international engagement. The ICRC is usually one of the first humanitarian organizations to negotiate access​[13]​ and the last one to leave a conflict zone. Engagement with the ICRC and its delegates therefore often means that warring parties get to interact with the wider international community and thus potentially obtain political backing and resources.​[14]​ Access to detention centres is often negotiated as part of a package comprising other forms of humanitarian assistance.  
By engaging in access negotiations and by dictating the terms of access, a warring party is able to demonstrate authority as a valid interlocutor, as a negotiator, and as a resource allocator. Authority as an interlocutor gives the warring party a foothold on the path to recognition by the international community including other aid agencies. Authority as a negotiator confers bargaining leverage on a warring party. Some rebel groups play international agencies off against each other to get the best bargain, or they negotiate the terms of access to detainees in such a way that aid materials go to areas controlled by their key supporters.​[15]​ Authority as a resource allocator provides a warring party with control of the resources it gets from external actors. A warring party can use humanitarian resources to appease its civilian supporters, and in some cases, unfortunately, divert materials for purposes of war.​[16]​ The demonstration of authority therefore brings tangible benefits such as war-related resources as well as non-tangible ones such as continuing relationships with outside support. 
Every aspect of humanitarian compliance involves a tradeoff between military considerations and a motivation to comply.​[17]​ The decision to grant access is no exception. By itself, the access decision does not alter the military balance overnight. However, access takes place in a broader context of strategic and tactical decisions. In particular, warring parties make decisions about access in connection with other strategic decisions about the treatment of civilians and detainees. The matter of granting access is intertwined with broader questions of military strategy regarding violence—or the risk of violence—toward civilians. In general, rebel groups that kill civilians are less likely to grant access. Running detention centres means that rebel groups have alternate means of controlling the population instead of indiscriminately killing enemy-sympathizers. Detention is often a form of selective violence with the primary aim of achieving better security and obtaining intelligence, as well as establishing civilian allegiance in the context of the type of asymmetric warfare that often characterizes civil conflicts.​[18]​ 
Granting humanitarian access may also affect the wartime strategy of treating detainees. The harsh treatment of security and civilian detainees may contribute to military gains.​[19]​ It is feasible that some warring parties —particularly those unfamiliar with the ICRC’s long-standing confidentiality policy such as rebel groups​[20]​— may believe that allowing ICRC delegates access to their detention centres has significant strategic consequences. They may perceive allowing the ICRC access to their prisons as an action that may compromise security benefits obtained through the harsh treatment of detainees. 




Hypotheses regarding Access Decisions by National Governments 

The key sources of legitimacy for national governments in internal conflicts are domestic and international audiences. Governments engaged in armed conflict have varying degrees of motivation to regain legitimacy in the eyes of these audiences. How dependent governments are on support from these domestic and international constituencies will determine how motivated they are to engage in actions that will make them appear more legitimate, such as granting the ICRC access to wartime detainees.  
For domestic audiences, we propose that a government’s regime type will correlate with legitimacy-seeking behaviour. Democratic regimes are more likely than autocratic ones to comply with international rules for several institutional reasons: democratic regimes are more sensitive than other regimes to electoral opinion,​[21]​ they have more highly developed institutions of civil society, and they have internal oversight mechanisms.​[22]​ This theoretical expectation is summarized in the following hypothesis:

H1-1 (Government Access Behaviour): National governments are more likely to grant access to the ICRC if they are democratic. 

This is not to suggest that democracies are free from human rights or humanitarian violations. As the recent literature on state repression shows, democracies in civil conflicts often violate international human rights or humanitarian rules in the face of severe security threats.​[23]​ However, democracies have institutional safeguards that ensure that measures to restrict human rights will be hotly debated in civil society and in national/regional courts,​[24]​ a characteristic lacking in authoritarian regimes. Therefore, we would expect the relationship between political regime type and access-granting behaviour to be positive, as proposed in H1-1. 
International audiences are also important to national governments as sovereignty comes not only from internal political support but also from external recognition. When a government relies strongly on foreign aid to survive, international audiences become even more essential. For governments in civil conflicts, losing external support can be linked to the very real consequence of reductions in foreign aid.​[25]​ In these cases governments cannot funnel resources to fight rebel forces. Granting access to the ICRC is not by itself a game changer and does not directly affect a government’s ability to defeat rebels. However, continued bad practices and the alienation of aid groups can cause a government’s situation to deteriorate by undermining its ability to accumulate war revenue. Denying visits can also create humanitarian disasters. This can lead to a decline in support for the government and an increase in support for the rebels. For these reasons, we would expect national governments to be more likely to grant access to the ICRC if they rely heavily on foreign aid. 

H1-2 (Government Access Behaviour): National governments are more likely to grant access to the ICRC if they rely heavily on foreign aid. 

At times, governments engaged in civil conflicts may have the political motivation to grant access to the ICRC, but security and capacity constraints may limit their ability to do so. For instance, when fighting several rebel groups simultaneously, overwhelmed national governments may prioritize specific security gains over legal obligations and may therefore be less likely to grant visits.​[26]​ A government’s decision to grant access when there is fighting on multiple fronts usually reflects a situation where significant investments have been made in the training of military and police forces, in improving living conditions in detention centres, as well as in providing a specific justification for each individual being held. The presence of splinter groups is likely to make it difficult for national governments to manage detention centres. Our expectation about the influence of security and capacity constraints is summarized in H1-3.  Figure 1 provides a summary of our theoretical expectations regarding government access-granting behaviour in times of civil conflict. 






Hypotheses regarding Access Decisions by Armed Opposition Groups

Not all armed opposition groups are created equal. Rebel groups come in different political stripes with varying motivations, a variety of organizational structures, and an assortment of different relationships with their core constituents. Consequently, some are more concerned with political legitimacy than others, and some have the means to pursue legitimacy while others do not. We argue that whether or not insurgents adhere to international rules depends primarily on two factors: 1) the future-oriented goals that define their motivations, and 2) the degree to which their current organizational characteristics enable them to do so. 
We suggest six empirical correlates of legitimacy-seeking behaviours for rebel groups: 1) presence of a legal political wing, 2) extent of domestic support, 3) territorial control, 4) extent of outside support from international actors, 5) group strength, and 6) existence of a centralized command structure. Each factor influences the strategic calculations that rebel groups must make in their pursuit of domestic and international legitimacy. The first three are principally related to domestic legitimacy. The fourth relates to efforts to establish international legitimacy. The final two can be considered capacity constraints, as they determine whether rebel groups that are motivated to appear legitimate will have the ability to allow the ICRC access in order to achieve this goal.  
The first correlate of legitimacy-seeking behaviour is the existence of a legal political wing. A political wing is the governing body of a rebel organization, often separate from its military wing. Having a political wing is one of the signs of rebel governance and of having a well-defined political agenda. A political wing also indicates that rebels have the propensity to substitute non-violent for violent means to achieve their goals, compared to the groups that are dominated by a military wing.​[27]​ Rebel groups with a political wing usually are interested in building interactions with other political actors through public relations programs. One of the foreign policies available to these groups is to negotiate with international humanitarian agencies. A political wing therefore facilitates the process of conforming to international rules, usually by articulating a political platform that addresses domestic and international audiences. 
In particular, a legally authorized political wing usually indicates a clear and established aspiration to become a legitimate political entity. Groups with legal political wings tend to be those that have participated in local or nationwide elections, or previously have been represented in government. Rebels with political wings that are legally authorized demonstrate a greater motivation to earn legitimacy than those whose political wings remain illegal and whose political activities through normal electoral channels are forbidden by their governments. Although obtaining legal recognition depends to a significant degree on the government the rebels oppose, the pursuit of legal recognition indicates a strong concern for achieving legitimacy and accompanying political experience. Particularly for rebel groups that aspire to be part of power-sharing arrangements or to participate in post-war politics, the pursuit of legal status provides an opportunity to obtain assistance from international donors. The rebel-to-party literature​[28]​ shows that groups with legal political wings often develop into established political entities during post-conflict periods if they successfully evolve and obtain popular support in peacetime. Examples include the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador.​[29]​ We summarize our expectation about the relationship between the existence of a legal political wing and access behaviour in the following hypothesis.  

H2-1 (Rebel Group Access Behaviour and Legal Political Wings): Armed opposition groups are more likely to grant access if they have a legal political wing.

Another indicator of legitimacy-seeking behaviour is the relationship rebel groups establish with civilians and their capacity to mobilize domestic supporters. Some rebel groups with deep ties to the local community provide security and public goods, such as education and administrative functions.​[30]​ These groups are more likely to grant the ICRC access, as they can profit from the general humanitarian assistance associated with detainee visits. This assistance usually includes food or sanitation services, or other humanitarian packages such as assistance to civilians in need. These resources are particularly welcome to groups that rely on civilian support for waging wars as opposed to relying on natural resources or outside support.​[31]​ On the other hand, rebel groups with no governing functions and no aspirations to govern are less inclined to grant visits because they are not interested in civilians receiving assistance from international organizations. To win and expand local support, groups that have the capacity to mobilize domestic support are in general more likely to grant visits to the ICRC.

H2-2 (Rebel Group Access Behaviour and Domestic Support): Armed opposition groups are more likely to grant access if they have high levels of domestic support.

The third indicator of recognition-seeking behaviour is territorial control. Territorial control is often associated with administrative functions, local support, and the provision of public goods. Exercising authority within a certain territory means having sustained control over civilians for some period of time. Groups that control territory are likely to exercise restraint with regard to violent actions against civilians.​[32]​ In the context of the type of asymmetrical warfare that is typical of civil conflicts, rebels often rely on civilians for information. This means that rebel groups that control territory will be motivated to hold security and civilian detainees in specific locations. In contrast, groups without territorial control that cannot build such facilities are likely to exercise hit-and-run operations resulting in more civilian casualties.​[33]​ Therefore, we expect rebel groups that control territory to be more likely to grant visits to the ICRC.

H2-3 (Rebel Group Access Behaviour and Territorial Control): Armed opposition groups are more likely to grant access if they have control over territory. 

The fourth indicator of legitimacy-seeking behaviour is the existence of non-military transnational support. Recent literature shows that civil wars are no longer strictly domestic affairs; they have transnational dimensions.​[34]​ Consequently, legitimacy-seeking behaviour extends to international audiences.​[35]​ Furthermore, some insurgent group leaders are politically savvy about international affairs and sometimes play off aid groups against each other to get a better bargain.​[36]​ 
Non-military support can take a number of forms: remittances from diasporas,​[37]​ backing by religious organizations, and resources inadvertently provided by aid agencies and human rights groups. These types of support can improve the financial position and diplomatic standing of rebel groups. We focus on non-military outside support because military support such as arms, fighters, and ammunition​[38]​ involves different strategic calculations on the part of the rebel leadership with respect to humanitarian or human rights behaviours. Receiving military support from other governments is usually not pursued as a means to achieve political legitimacy, but rather as a means to fuel the violence. 

H2-4 (Rebel Group Access Behaviour and Non-military Transnational Support): Armed opposition groups are more likely to grant access if they receive non-military support from non-state transnational actors.

Some rebel groups will have the political motivation to appear legitimate by granting access, although this does not mean that every group will be able to do so. Insurgents also need the capacity to negotiate. Military strength is one of the characteristics that enable a rebel group to negotiate with external actors. Militarily strong groups will be able to negotiate with external humanitarian actors with relative ease while militarily weak groups may lack the necessary capabilities to do so.  
In addition to military strength, the strength of a group’s central command-and-control structure plays two key roles in defining a rebel group’s capacity to negotiate with external actors. First, it enables the group to engage in negotiations with outside actors such as the ICRC. Second, it increases the probability that whatever agreement is reached with the ICRC is actually enforced, as only groups with centralized leadership will have an effective control over far-flung detention centres and lower-ranking soldiers. This observation corresponds to Weinstein’s argument that the organizational structure of rebel groups plays a key role in determining their behaviour.​[39]​ This is also in line with the findings of the importance of centralized command and control in enforcing the laws of war in interstate conflicts.​[40]​ We sum up the expectations about these organizational structures in the following additional hypotheses.

H2-5 (Rebel Group Access Behaviour and Military Strength): Armed opposition groups are more likely to grant access if they are militarily strong. 

H2-6 (Rebel Group Access Behaviour and Command and Control Structure): Armed opposition groups are more likely to grant access if they have a centralized command and control structure. 

Figure 2 summarizes our theoretical expectations regarding rebel group access behaviour in times of civil conflict. The four factors we outlined with respect to insurgent groups’ organizational and political characteristics – legal political wing, high domestic support, territorial control, and transnational support – indicate a willingness to pursue legitimacy and political recognition. The last two factors – military strength and centralized control – enable groups to pursue actions to reach these aspirations. Note that these are not perfect indicators of the pursuit of legitimacy but rather ‘correlates’ of motivation and opportunity. If one were to place rebel groups on a scale measuring legitimacy-seeking behaviour, those with all six characteristics are more likely to be on the higher end of the scale than those with fewer of these characteristics.  
[FIGURE 2 HERE]










The dependent variable is a visitation record indicating whether each warring party granted the ICRC access to its detainee facilities in each conflict year. Our code contains four categories: 1) full visitation rights were granted, 2) partial visitation rights were granted, 3) no visits were allowed, and 4) information was missing and classification was not possible.
Information on access was extracted from the ICRC’s annual reports, in which the organization provides descriptions of its work on the ground. We coded ‘full access’ in cases where a party’s agreement to allow ICRC visits actually resulted in an ICRC visit conducted following their standard procedures, including private interviews with detainees. We coded ‘partial access’ when the ICRC could not access a particular class of detainees held for security reasons. For instance, Israel was coded as ‘partial access’ between 1991 and 2006, except for 2005, because it did not grant access to some Lebanese prisoners.​[50]​ We assigned a ‘no access’ code only when the annual report clearly stated that the ICRC’s proposal to conduct visits had been explicitly rejected.​[51]​ If the issue of visits was not addressed, we conservatively coded as ‘missing data.’  
Simple descriptive statistics reveal important information about access behaviour. As Table 1 shows, rebel groups allowed the ICRC to visit prisoners less frequently than governments did. Specifically, rebel groups granted full or partial access in 15% of our total observation points. Governments allowed ICRC delegates full or partial access to their detention facilities in approximately 60% of our total observation points. Of the countries in our sample 98% had ratified the Geneva Convention by 1990, which implies that the ratification of the Geneva Convention does not have any discriminating power in terms of explaining access behaviour. Conventional explanations of treaty compliance rely on the power of ratification,​[52]​ but in our case, treaty commitment cannot predict adherence to the norm of granting access to the ICRC.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Access records show temporal variation for a good number of governments and rebel groups over the course of a multi-year conflict, which motivates us not to aggregate all the years into one single observation. Examples of governments that varied their access patterns in the time span we analyze include: Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Peru, Indonesia, Iraq, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal and Sri Lanka. On the rebel side, groups that varied their access behaviour include UNITA in Angola, the Serbian Republic of Krajina in Yugoslavia, SPLM/A in Sudan, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Transition rates – change in behaviour from one year to the next within one dyad – tell us that there is some variation. No visits remain as no visits in subsequent years 68% of the time, partial visits remain as partial visits for 51% of our observations, and 79% of the time, full visitation rights remain as full visits. These variations indicate that norm diffusion does not occur in a monotonic fashion. 
The dataset includes numerous ‘missing data’ codes due to the fact that for several annual reports the issue of obtaining access to prisoners was not mentioned. On the government side, 24% of data is missing; on the rebel side, 78%. We tackle the problem of missing data for the rebel groups on both substantive and methodological fronts. From a substantive point of view, missing data is not a consequence of a faulty research design. Rather, the source of this fragmentary data reflects the reality of humanitarian access. The missing data in our study resulted from the failure or difficulty of humanitarian negotiations between the ICRC and rebel groups. We therefore assume that there was no access in missing cases. From a methodological point of view, missing data do not bias the results if they are missing at random.​[53]​ However, missing data in this case seems to be non-random. A series of difference of means tests (t-tests) and variance comparisons (F-tests) reveal that missing cases are systematically different from non-missing ones for some covariates.​[54]​ 




As key explanatory variables, we include the correlates of legitimacy-seeking behaviour. On the government side, we include Political Regime Type. The measure we use is the continuous 20-point scale from autocracy to democracy from the Polity IV project.​[58]​ Dependency on foreign aid is measured by the amount of aid as a percentage of gross domestic income. Governments capacity constraints are captured by including the Number of Rebel Groups a government is fighting.​[59]​ Additionally, we control for military balance by including a measure of rebel groups’ Military Strength in the model for governments’ access. 
On the rebel side, the key explanatory variables include Legal Political Wing, Mobilization Capacity, Territorial Control and Transnational Support. Legal Political Wing indicates whether the insurgents have a political wing that is recognized as a legal organization.​[60]​ Mobilization Capacity is an ordinal variable that measures a group’s ability to recruit personnel; it is low, moderate, or high and indicates an insurgent group’s level of reliance on domestic support. Territorial Control is a binary variable indicating whether the group controlled territory. Transnational Support measures the level of non-military support for rebel groups from transnational non-state actors; it ranges from no support, to tacit support, to explicit support. To account for the military characteristics of rebel groups that determine their organizational capacity to comply with international rules, we include two key variables: Military Strength and Strength of Central Command. Military Strength measures the group’s military power relative to that of the government.​[61]​ Strength of Central Command indicates whether a group has established an identifiable central command over the constituent groups that make up the rebel movement. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]





We report a total of twelve models of humanitarian access to detention centres, six for national governments (Table 3) and six for armed opposition groups (Table 4). Given the ordered nature of our dependent variable – no visits, partial visits and full visits — we present an ordered probit analysis. ​[65]​ In all models, we use cubic polynomials​[66]​ to account for the potential temporal dependence.​[67]​ Our goal in the following empirical analyses is to examine the explanatory power of legitimacy-related variables in decisions about granting access to detention centres, controlling for structural factors and alternative explanations.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The six models in Table 3 are the results of ordered probit analyses for governments’ access-granting behaviour. Models 3-1 and 3-2 present the effects of key explanatory variables. Model 3-1 tests H1-1 and H1-2 pertaining to domestic and international legitimacy-related variables, namely political regime type and aid dependency. The results in Model 3-1 indicate that democratic governments are more likely to grant access than autocracies, thus supporting our expectations set forth in H1-1 regarding democratic governments’ higher legitimacy concerns.​[68]​ We also find support for H1-2: Governments that rely more heavily on foreign aid are more likely to grant visits to the ICRC than governments that do not. 
Model 3-2 presents the effect of military and strategic variables.​[69]​ In line with H1-3 regarding the capacity constraints of governments, access becomes less likely as the number of rebel groups a government is simultaneously fighting increases.​[70]​ The effect of military strength is positive, indicating that governments facing strong rebel groups are more likely to grant visits.​[71]​ Model 3-3 controls for structural variables in civil wars such as a conflict’s intensity and duration and type of terrain. 
Model 3-4 assesses the influence of reciprocity – one of the key compliance mechanisms suggested by previous research.​[72]​ We test the reciprocity effect by examining whether one party’s behaviour at time t will affect another party’s behaviour at the subsequent period. ​[73]​ We expect reciprocity to be rather weak in the context of visits to detention centers in civil conflicts. For reciprocity to work, rules should be clear, a shared understanding should be present, and violations should be easily identifiable and detectable.​[74]​ Civil war environments satisfy none of these conditions fully.​[75]​ Norms regulating detention procedures in internal conflicts, including the status of detainees in civil wars, are generally not clear.​[76]​ ICRC visits and human rights violations, such as the use of coercive interrogation, are not entirely visible to the other party. Furthermore, rebel groups usually don't have the same control as national governments do over lower ranking soldiers. This often leads to severe agency problems as lower ranking soldiers in rebel groups can stray from guidelines set forth by leaders. As the result of Model 3-4 shows, the insignificant influence of an insurgent groups’ behaviour on governments’ visitation decisions indicates a weak effect of reciprocity. 
Model 3-5 takes into account an alternative explanation for humanitarian compliance identified in the literature on interstate wars. We control for whether a conflict is classified as one where different ethnicities are fighting each other. The literature has noted that when fighters consider their opponent as being beyond the pale of civilization, human rights are less likely to be respected.​[77]​ Our results confirm that, in such cases, the ICRC is unlikely to be granted permission to visit detainees. 
Model 3-6 investigates the alternative argument that human rights violations may influence governments’ decision to allow the ICRC into their detention centres. It is plausible to think that governments with bad human rights behaviour may have an incentive to refuse ICRC access. Alternatively, it may be the case that governments with good human rights behaviour would want to signal their good behaviour by granting access. We employ the Physical Integrity Index from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset as our measure for government’s human rights violations. This index includes four components: 1) if governments engage in extrajudicial killing, 2) if governments engage in political imprisonment, 3) if governments engage in torture, and 4) if disappearances are frequent. Each component variable takes a value of 0, 1, or 2 for any given year. A score of 2 indicates that no violations took place, a score of 1 implies they occurred occasionally, while a score of 0 indicates that violations were widespread. The composite physical integrity index thus fluctuates between 0 (highest violations of human rights) and 8 (highest respect for human rights). We find weak evidence for this screening/signaling argument. If governments screen ICRC visits based on human rights violations or signal good human rights behaviours by accepting the ICRC in, we would find a significant relationship between Physical Integrity Index and access-granting behavior. However, we find no such relationship between the two.

 [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Table 4 reports the results of our analyses of access-granting behaviour by armed opposition groups. The first three models assess the effects of legitimacy-seeking correlates on the probability of rebels granting access. Model 4-1 examines the effect of variables associated with groups seeking domestic legitimacy – having a legal political wing, domestic mobilization capacity, and territorial control. Model 4-2 adds the military characteristics that determine whether rebel groups with the motivation to seek legitimacy will actually have the organizational capacity to follow through – military strength and command structure. Model 4-3 examines whether receiving non-military transnational support will prompt armed opposition groups to grant access to the ICRC. In line with our expectations regarding rebels’ legitimacy concerns, the models show that rebel groups with legal political wings, domestic support that can be mobilized, territorial control and transnational support are more likely than other groups to grant access to their detention centres.
Models 4-4 through 4-6 examine alternative explanations for access behaviour. Model 4-4 includes three structural variables that have been identified in the literature​[78]​ as being pertinent to analyses of civil conflicts. The core results for the legitimacy-related indicators do not lose significance. Model 4-5 provides a test of reciprocity as an alternative compliance mechanism. As was the case for government access behaviour, we find weak evidence for reciprocity. Although reciprocity has proven to be a robust predictor of compliance behaviour in interstate relations, we conclude that it does not significantly affect the access-granting behavior of warring parties in intra-state conflicts. Model 4-6 examines whether access behavior is influenced by other types of human rights behaviours. Specifically, we assess whether rebel groups that kill more civilians are likely to screen ICRC delegates out of their detention centres so that external witnesses do not see violations that could be used in future international criminal justice cases. We use a count of civilian killing by rebel groups from the One-Sided Violence dataset.​[79]​ The results show some support of this screening argument, as groups that exterminate civilians are generally less likely than other groups to grant open visits. 
The analyses in Table 4 are based on the assumption that missing visits are equivalent to cases in which no visits took place. We examine whether this assumption is warranted by employing Heckman selection models.​[80]​ Missing data is akin to a sample selection problem because we are working with a non-random sub-sample – armed groups with non-missing values for humanitarian access – from a larger population of interest, that is, all armed groups. Given the large amount of missing data in our dataset for rebel access behaviour, we want to ensure that missing values do not significantly alter the core results. If a selection model does not alter our key findings, then missing data does not have a systematic effect on the robustness of the results shown from the ordered probit model. Additionally, if the selection process is not necessarily required to explain the access-granting decision outcome, as estimated by the parameter rho in Heckman selection models, then we can state that the missing-as-no-visit assumption does not bias our results. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Table 5 reports the results for the Heckman selection models. The selection equations model the process through which cases are selected into either our sample or into the group of missing values. The dependent variable for the selection equations takes a value of 1 if an observation is selected into the sample of available data and of 0 if access behavior for an observation is missing. The outcome equations model whether a rebel group granted or denied the ICRC visits to detainees among available data. The dependent variable for the outcome equations is 1 if a partial or full visit took place and 0 if no visits occurred. The selection models and accompanying statistics show that the estimates reported in Table 4 are reliable. Most importantly, an insignificant athrho in the selection models indicates that the pattern of missing data does not bias our estimates and that selection bias should not be a concern. 
Heckman selection models require an identifying variable that influences the selection of cases into the sample without affecting the outcome value of a dependent variable.​[81]​ This requirement is called an exclusion restriction. Sovey and Green (2011) suggest that researchers address two points. First, they should explain that there is no direct effect of the identifying variable on the dependent variable. Second, they should check whether there is a backdoor path through witch an identifying variable affects missing values which in turn affect the dependent variable. These two recommendations are closely related, except that the second one adds an extra step. 
We think that the duration of a conflict fulfills the exclusion restriction requirements. A conflict’s duration fulfills the first requirement of “indirect effects” because there is no direct effect of the duration of a conflict on visitation outcome. The duration of a conflict affects whether visitation data is available for a rebel group, but there is no theoretical reason to suppose that the duration of a conflict affects a rebel group’s decision to grant access. A conflict’s duration also fulfills the second related requirement of “backdoor paths.” The duration of a conflict affects the generation of missing data because of the nature of humanitarian negotiations.​[82]​ However, once a rebel group has been contacted by the ICRC, therefore being part of the sample of available data, the probability of granting visits does not depend on a conflict’s duration but on other factors such as political aims and security situations. Empirical evidence supports our claims. The statistical insignificance of the Duration variable in the outcome equation indicates that insurgents grant access not because they have been around for a long time, but because of their legitimacy-seeking characteristics.​[83]​ 
The selection models include variables that are theoretically expected to contribute to the generation of missing data. We chose the variables based on our knowledge about the realities of humanitarian operations. Model 5-1 reports the effect of structural variables such as terrain and conflict duration. Mountainous terrain reduces the probability of rebel groups entering into the sample because the ICRC would face physical difficulties in visiting prisons. Conflicts of longer duration are more likely to be in the sample of available data because humanitarian actors need time to respond, organize, and build connections with rebels. 
Model 5-2 gauges the likelihood that detention centres exist since whether rebels have detainees also affect the generation of missing data. We do so by adding variables that measure the size of a group’s fighting force and the number of battlefield deaths. Rebel organizations might not have detainees because their size is relatively small or because they are fighting in small-scale conflicts. In those cases, due to lack of organizational capacity or due to the fact the small groups may not be on the ICRC’s radar, missing data can be generated. Usually, intense conflicts with large battle-death counts are more likely to attract humanitarian actors such as the ICRC. Finally, in Model 5-3, we test whether other human rights violations influence the selection of cases into the sample of available data, taking into account the strategic and screening arguments discussed on page 31. 
The results indicate two things. First, the estimates we reported under the assumption that missing data cases are equivalent to ‘no visit’ cases are valid. We arrive at this conclusion by observing the Wald test of the rho parameter that measures the correlation between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations. An insignificant rho shows that selection models are not necessary to estimate the unbiased effect of our legitimacy variables and that selection bias does not pose a threat to inference. Second, the selection and outcome equations are inherently interrelated partly because of the missing-as-no-visit assumption, and some variables contribute to the selection process while others contribute to the outcome process. For instance, rebel groups’ Military Strength affects the possibility of access being granted via the selection process by which cases get included in the sample, but Rebel Political Wing and Mobilization Capacity primarily affect the outcome equation.
Given that the key legitimacy indicators are closely inter-related both conceptually and empirically,​[84]​ we would like to provide a sense of the magnitude of the effects of each variable. We report changes in the probabilities of warring parties granting access to the ICRC for certain values of each individual variable in Table 6.​[85]​ We vary one explanatory variable at a time, from minimum to maximum values, fixing other variables at their means and observe the rate of change in our dependent variable. We also report the average changes – absolute values of the magnitude of changes – each independent variable exerts on our dependent variable across the three categories of no, partial and full visits. Our estimation results indicate that the most democratic governments are 27% more likely than the most autocratic ones to grant the ICRC full visits. Governments that rely heavily on foreign aid are 55% more likely to allow full visits than those who are not reliant on foreign aid. The governments that fight the largest number of rebel groups, fifteen in our sample, are 24% less likely to grant full visits to the ICRC than other governments that fight none.  
For armed opposition groups, legitimacy-related variables increase the probability of full visits by 5 – 61% and decrease the probability of no visits by 11 – 75%. Controlling territory increases the probability of armed opposition groups granting full access by 13%. Groups that do not receive transnational support are 11% more likely to deny visits than rebel organizations that receive explicit transnational support. Rebel groups that do not have a legal political wing are 18% less likely to grant any kind of visits than groups with such legal representation. Lacking a central command structure decreases the probability of granting visits by 12%. We find that having a high capacity to mobilize supporters and being militarily strong are particularly influential on a rebel group’s propensity to grant full visitation rights. In a hypothetical scenario where a formerly weak rebel group becomes one of the strongest in our sample, the likelihood of the group granting ICRC delegates full access increases by 61%. The magnitude of these substantive effects shows that factors related to legitimacy-promotion and negotiating capacity determine the access behaviour of armed opposition groups.
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Table 7 takes stock of actual cases in which rebel groups provided ICRC delegates full access to their detention centres. Within the time period we examine, rebel organizations granted the ICRC full access to their wartime prisons for a total of 66 conflict-years. For 53 out of these 66 conflict-years, rebels that granted full access controlled territory. For 60 out of the 66 conflict-years, rebels that granted full access exhibited moderately strong or strong central commands. Roughly half of the time that rebels granted full visits, they received at least implicit transnational support, possessed a moderate to high mobilization capacity, and were not militarily weaker than the government they opposed.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

Several examples of particular rebel groups that granted full visits illustrate the legitimacy-seeking behaviours we have discussed above. For the first example, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) cultivated international support, sending high-ranking delegations to Europe to garner assistance.​[86]​ The second example involves the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which became a legal political party in 2002 and engaged in electoral politics.​[87]​ The third example is from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). After the independence of Southern Sudan, one of the party platforms of SPLM/A involved claiming to “respect all international law and treaty obligations to which New Sudan is a signatory.”​[88]​ These three examples show that it is plausible to think that the groups’ legitimacy-seeking activities are closely related to their track record in terms of granting access to the ICRC.




We conclude by discussing the main implications of our findings and placing them in the broader context of compliance research. Existing compliance research has been developed primarily in the context of inter-state relations. However, given the importance of non-state actors in world politics, we advocate that more research needs to be done to understand the compliance behaviour of non-state actors. Our work suggests that conventional compliance mechanisms developed in the context of interstate relations—such as the power of treaties, reciprocity, and norm diffusion—may fail to explain norm adherence by non-state actors. 
In this paper we hypothesized that the desire and motivation to achieve legitimacy might explain compliance with international law. Without a clear legal obligation and without explicit consent, compliance by non-state actors depends on whether their political motivations are in line with international rules. Our findings suggest that scholars may have to revisit existing theories of compliance in explaining humanitarian and human rights behaviours of state and non-state actors. 
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Table 2. Variables and Data Source

Variable	Description	Data Source
Political Regime Type 	Index of Political Regime (range: -10 to 10, most autocratic to most democratic)	Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2002)
Aid Dependency	Net overseas development assistance received as % of gross national income	World Bank
Number of Rebel Groups	A count of the number of rebel groups fighting each national government	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2007
Legal Rebel Political Wing	Presence of a legally allowed political wing. 1 = no, 2 = does not apply, 3 = unclear, 4 = yes 	Non-state actor dataset v.2.4 (Cunningham et al. 2009)
Mobilization Capacity	Ability of the rebel group to mobilize personnel, relative to the government. 1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3=high	Non-state actor dataset v.2.4 (Cunningham et al. 2009)
Territorial Control	0 = no control over territory, 1= rebels control territory	Non-state actor dataset v.2.4 (Cunningham et al. 2009)
Transnational Support	1 = no support of a rebel group by a transnational non-state actor in a non-military manner, 2 = tacit support,  3 = explicit support 	Non-state actor dataset v.2.4 (Cunningham et al. 2009)
Rebel Group Strength	1 = much weaker than government, 2 = weaker than government, 3 = power parity, 4 = stronger than government, 5 = much stronger than government.	Non-state actor dataset v.2.4 (Cunningham et al. 2009)
Strength of Central Command 	0 = the control of the central command is unclear, 1 = low control, , 2 =moderate control, 3= high degree of central command control	Non-state actor dataset v.2.4 (Cunningham et al. 2009)
Battle Deaths Count	Best estimate for battle-related deaths	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2007
Duration	Count of years that a conflict lasts since 1991.	Authors
Intensity of Conflict	Intensity level of a conflict (0 = minor conflict, between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year; 1 = war, at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year)	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2007
Mountainous Terrain	Characteristic of terrain in conflict (0 to 5 scale)	Fearon 2004
Size of Rebel Group	Best estimate of rebel group size	Cunningham et al. 2009
Physical Integrity Index	Composite index that fluctuates between a 0 (highest violations of human rights) to 8 (highest respect for human rights). 	Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset
Ethnic War	1 = non-ethnic wars, 2 =mixed or ambiguous wars, 3 =ethnic wars.	Fearon 2004
Civilian Killing Count	Count of civilians killed by rebel groups	Eck & Hultman 2007
 

Table 3. Ordered Probit Analyses of Access to Detainees Granted by National Governments

	Model 3-1	Model 3-2	Model 3-3	Model 3-4	Model 3-5	Model 3-6






Number of Rebel Groups		-0.041**				
		(0.018)				
Rebel Group Military Strength		0.285***				
		(0.080)				



















Table 4. Ordered Probit Analyses of Access to Detainees Granted by Armed Opposition Groups
 
	Model  4-1	Model 4-2	Model 4-3	Model 4-4	Model 4-5	Model 4-6












Rebel Group Military Strength		0.718***	0.695***	0.603***	0.683***	0.676***
		(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.127)	(0.159)	(0.132)






Government Access Behaviour (Lagged)					0.212(0.301)	
Civilian Killing Count						-0.00199**
						(0.000880)









Table 5. Heckman Selection Models and Analysis of Missing Data 

	MODEL 5-1Selection by Structural Factors	MODEL 5-2Selection by Detention Possibilities	MODEL 5-3Selection by Human Rights Violations










Rebel Group Military Strength	-0.0137		-0.0794		0.0130	
	(0.207)		(0.409)		(0.145)	










Battlefield Deaths (Intensity of Conflict)		-0.175**(0.0697)		0.000370***(7.37e-05)		0.000368***(9.04e-05)










Table 6. Marginal Effects and Changes
in Predicted Probabilities of Warring Parties’ Granting Access to the ICRC 
According to Change in Legitimacy Correlates 

National Governments
	Average change	Probability of no visit	Probability of partial visit	Probability of full visit
Political Regime Type Min (-10 most autocratic)          Max (10 most democratic)Marginal Effect	.173[.165, .199].009[.0091, .0093]	-.180 [-.045, -.315]-.009 [-.015, -.002]	-.093[-.098, -.088]-.005[-.009, -.001]	.273[.083, .464].014[.004, .024]
Aid DependencyMin (0 no foreign aid)            Max (100% reliance on aid))                   Marginal Effect	.365[.349, .379].009[.0089, .0092]	-.245[-.306, -.182]-.009[-.013, -.004]	-.302[-.360, -.245]-.005[-.008, -.003]	.547[.472, .621].014[.007, .020]
Number of Rebel GroupsMin (0 no foreign aid)            Max (15 groups)                   Marginal Effect	.151[.147, .175].011[.0107, .0109]	.176[.013, .340].011[.001, .020]	.066[.064, .067].005[.000, .010]	-.242[-.448, -.036]-.016[-.031, -.002]
Note: The estimates for the first two variables are based on model 3-1. The estimate for number of opposition groups is based on model 3-2. Ninety five percent confidence intervals are in square brackets. 

Armed Opposition Groups
	Average change	Probability of no visit	Probability of partial visit	Probability of full visit
Legal Political Wing    Min (1 No political wing)    Max (4 legal political wing)Marginal Effect	.122[.119, .126].034[.033, .034]	-.183[-.297, -.070]-.050[-.078, -.022]	.064[.044, .085].020[.007, .033]	.119[.037, .201].030[.012, .048]
Mobilization Capacity            Min (1 low)              Max (3 high)                     Marginal Effect	.280[.274, .285].084[.081, .088]	-.420[-.591, -.250]-.126[-.172, -.080]	.121[.080, .162].051[.025, .077]	.299[.153, .445].076[.045, .106]
Control of Territory          Min (0 no control of territory)   Max (1 control of territory)	.132[.130, .135]	-.198[-.258, -.138]	.071[.048, .093]	.128[.082, .173]
Transnational Support             Min (1 No support)              Max (3 Explicit support)                 Marginal Effect	.065[.061, .070].025[.024, .026]	-.098[-.170, .-.027]-.040[-.065, -.011]	.051[.037, .066].021[.007, .036]	.047[.003, .091].017[.001, .032]
Rebel Group Military Strength Min (1 weakest group)              Max (5 strongest group)Marginal Effect	.497[.464, .531].050[.048, .052]	-.746[-.963, -.529]-.075[-.112, -.038]	.132[.077, .187].040[.021, .059]	.614[.352, .880].036[.011, .060]
Strength of Central Command            Min (0 unclear)             Max (3 high)Marginal Effect	.081[.076, .085].030[.029, .032]	-.121[-.188, -.054]-.046[-.071, -.020]	.062[.045, .079].024[.007, .041]	.059[.024, .095].022[.009, .034]
Note: The estimates for the first three variables are based on model 4-1. The estimate for transnational support is based on model 4-3.  The estimates for the last two variables are based on model 4-2. Ninety five percent confidence intervals are in square brackets. 

Table 7. Characteristics of Rebel Groups that Granted the ICRC Full Access to Detainees

Location	Rebel Groups	Years 	Legal Political Wing (Party Name if Yes) 	Mobilization Capacity	Territorial Control	Trans-national Support	Rebel Group Strength	Strength of Central Command
Afghanistan	Hezb-i-Islami, Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami, Jumbish-i-Milli-ye Islami	1993,1995	No	moderate	No	missing	parity 	moderate
Afghanistan	Jamaat-i-Islami, Jumbish-i-Milli-ye Islami, Taleban, UIFSA	1995, 1996	No	low to moderate	No	No	parity	moderate
Afghanistan	UIFSA	1998,2000,2001	No	moderate	Yes	No 	weaker than government	moderate
Angola	UNITA	1993,1994,1995	Yes (UNITA)	moderate	Yes	No	parity	high
Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	2005	No	missing	missing	missing	missing	missing
Colombia	FARC, ELN	1996	Yes for FARC (Patriotic Union)	low	Yes	No	weaker than government	low
Cote D’Ivoire	MJP, MPCI, MPIGO	2002	Yes (Forces Nouvelles)	moderate	Yes	missing	parity	moderate to high
Cote D’Ivoire	Forces Nouvelles	2004	Yes (Forces Nouvelles)	missing	Yes	missing	parity	missing
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	MLC, RCD, RCD-ML	1998,1999,2000,2001	No	low to moderate	Yes	tacit 	parity	moderate
Djibouti	FRUD	1992	No	moderate	Yes	tacit 	parity	missing
Georgia	Republic of Abkhazia	1992	No	moderate	Yes	tacit 	weaker than government	high
Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1998,1999	No	high	No	No 	stronger than government 	high
Indonesia	GAM	2002,2005	No	high	Yes	No	weaker than government 	moderate
Iraq	SCIRI	1994	No	low	No	tacit 	much weaker than government	unclear
Iraq	KDP, PUK	1991,1992,1993,1996	Yes (Kurdish Political Party)	low to moderate	Yes	explicit 	weaker than government	moderate
Liberia	INPFL, NPFL, LURD, MODEL	1991,1992,1993,1994,1995,2003	No	low to moderate	Yes	No 	much stronger than government	moderate
Nepal	CPN/M	2004,2005,2006	No	moderate	Yes	No	weaker than government	moderate
Philippines	ASG, MILF	1998	No 	low to moderate	No	tacit	weaker than government	moderate
Russia	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)	1994	No	moderate	Yes	explicit 	weaker than government	low
Rwanda	FPR	1993	No	low	No	explicit 	stronger than government	high
Sierra Leone	AFRC, Kamajors, RUF	1997	Yes (Revolutionary United Front)	low	No	No	parity	moderate
Somalia	SNM, SPM, SSDF, USC, USC-faction	1991,1992,1995,1996	No	low to moderate	Yes	No	parity	high
Sri Lanka	LTTE	1993,1994,1998,1999, 2000,2001	No	moderate	Yes	explicit 	weaker than government	high
Sudan	SPLM/A, JEM, SLM/A, NRF, SLM/A (MM)	1992, 1993, 1994,1996, 1997, 1999,2000, 2002,2004, 2005,2006	No†	moderate	Yes	explicit 	weaker than government	moderate
Togo	Military Faction	1991	Yes (Rally of the Togolese People) 	missing	No	No	parity	high
Turkey 	PKK	1996	 Yes (People’s Democracy Party)	missing	No	explicit 	weaker than government	moderate
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	UCK	1998	No	high	Yes	explicit 	weaker than government	high
† Since 1995 the SPLM has an acknowledged political wing.
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